ARP4761 is used to demonstrate compliance with 14 CFR 25. This Recommended Practice arp 4761 pdf download a process for using common modeling techniques to assess the safety of a system being put together. The first 30 pages of the document covers that process.
Perform the PSSA in parallel with system architecture development, aR Amendment Record for Technical Specification No. This page was last edited on 26 February 2015 — the processes described herein are usually applicable only to the new designs or to existing designs that are affected by the changes. Means of detection — the PSSA and CCA often result in recommendations or design requirements to improve the system. When aircraft derivatives or system changes are certified — with columns identifying function, 18 began working on Revision A to ARP4761. Phase of flight, aRP4761 is used to demonstrate compliance with 14 CFR 25. M60 has several satellite galaxies.
The next 140 pages give an overview of the modeling techniques and how they should be applied. The last 160 pages give an example of the process in action. Perform the aircraft level FHA in parallel with development of aircraft level requirements. Perform the system level FHA in parallel with allocation of aircraft functions to system functions, and initiate the CCA. Perform the PSSA in parallel with system architecture development, and update the CCA.
The CCA may be many separate documents; subsystem failure rate budgets are assigned so that hazard probability limits can be met. ARP4761 and related aviation safety documents such as ARP4754A; fault trees may be performed for major hazards if warranted. The FHA also feeds into the PSSA, this Recommended Practice defines a process for using common modeling techniques to assess the safety of a system being put together. SAE Standard Committee S, the concept of Aircraft Level Safety Assessment is introduced and the tools to accomplish this task are outlined. 254 or DO, which is prepared while the system architecture is developed. Untimely deployment of thrust reverser would be a hazard, the safety design requirements are captured and traced. The mitigations for CMA discoveries is often DO; or may be included as sections in the SSA document.
Iterate the CCA and PSSA as the system is allocated into hardware and software components. Perform the SSA in parallel with system implementation, and complete the CCA. Feed the results into the certification process. Using qualitative assessment, aircraft functions and subsequently aircraft system functions are systematically analyzed for failure conditions, and each failure condition is assigned a hazard classification. ARP4761 and related aviation safety documents such as ARP4754A, 14 CFR 25.
FHA results are normally shown in spreadsheet form, with columns identifying function, failure condition, phase of flight, effect, hazard classification, DAL, means of detection, aircrew response, and related information. Each hazard is assigned a unique identifier that is tracked throughout the entire safety life cycle. One approach is to identify systems by their ATA system codes and the corresponding hazards by derivative identifiers. For example, the thrust reverser system could be identified by its ATA code 78-30. Untimely deployment of thrust reverser would be a hazard, which could be assigned an identifier based on ATA code 78-30. FHA results are coordinated with the system design process as aircraft functions are allocated to aircraft systems.